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Abstract
In this paper, a safety case pattern is introduced to facilitate the presentation of a correctness argument for a
system implemented using formal methods in the development process. We took advantage of our experience
in constructing a safety case for the Patient Controlled Analgesic (PCA) infusion pump, to define this safety
case pattern. The proposed pattern is appropriate to be instantiated within the safety cases constructed for
systems that are developed by applying model-based approaches.
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Abstract. In this paper, a safety case pattern is introduced to facilitate
the presentation of a correctness argument for a system implemented us-
ing formal methods in the development process. We took advantage of
our experience in constructing a safety case for the Patient Controlled
Analgesic (PCA) infusion pump, to define this safety case pattern. The
proposed pattern is appropriate to be instantiated within the safety cases
constructed for systems that are developed by applying model-based ap-
proaches.
Keywords: safety cases, safety case patterns, model-based development
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1 Introduction
A Patient Controlled Analgesic (PCA) infusion pump is one type of infusion
pump that primarily delivers pain relievers, and is equipped with a feature that
allows for additional limited delivery of medication, called bolus, upon patient
demand. We are developing a PCA implementation software by using the model-
based approach based on the Generic PCA model [2] and the Generic PCA safety
requirements [1] provided by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as
shown in [14].
According to FDAs Infusion Pump Improvement Initiative [16], the FDA
has received over 56,000 reports of adverse events associated with the use of
infusion pumps from 2005 through 2009. The FDA structured 510k guidance
document [15] to assist industry in preparing premarket notification submis-
sions for infusion pumps. These recommendations are intended to improve the
quality of infusion pumps in order to reduce the number of recalls and infusion
pump Medical Device Reports (MDRs). In 510k submissions, the FDA recom-
mends device manufacturers to submit infusion pump information (i.e., what
beneficial properties the manufacturer claims for the infusion pump and how
those properties are supported by the provided evidences) through a framework
known as an assurance case [5]. This recommendation is the main motivation
for our work.
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An assurance case is a way to demonstrate the validity of a claim by providing
a convincing argument together with supporting evidence (e.g., testing results,
analysis results, etc.). The 510k guidance document specifically mentions the
safety case [11] that is a special form of the assurance case that addresses safety.
There is often commonality among the structures of the argument used in safety
cases. This commonality motivates the definition for the concept of safety case
patterns [11], which is an approach to support the reuse of safety arguments
between safety cases. For example, patterns extracted from a safety case built
for a specific product can be reused in constructing safety cases for other products
that are developed via similar processes.
We are constructing a safety case for the PCA implementation software. The
term “PCA implementation software” means the software code that is automat-
ically generated from the GPCA reference model, and then extended to interface
with the target platform [14]. The ultimate goal of this safety case construction
is to show that the PCA implementation software we developed is acceptably
safe, with the intention of providing a guiding example of safety cases for other
infusion pumps. We are constructing the PCA safety case concurrently with the
PCA implementation development. This concurrent development enables assur-
ance needs to drive development decisions [5].
The main contribution of this paper is to define a safety case pattern that
allows the incorporation of the belief in the model correctness obtained by
using formal methods in the development process. This pattern is appropriate in
constructing safety cases for infusion pumps those are developed using the model-
based approach. The paper is organized as follows: we start by briefly giving
background information in Section 2. Section 3 describes the main contribution
of the paper which proposes a safety case pattern. Related work is discussed in
Section 4. Finally, conclusions and ongoing work are given in Section 5.
2 Background
Two important concepts are used in this paper: “safety case patterns” and “the
model-based development”.
Safety case patterns [12] are defined to capture successful (i.e., convincing,
sound, etc.) arguments that are used within the safety case. Whenever a safety
case pattern is found to be appropriate to apply in a new safety case development,
then it is instantiated within this new safety case. Therefore, safety case patterns
allow reusing successful arguments among different safety cases. In essence, the
patterns concept attempts to encourage best practice in creating and reviewing
safety cases [6]. The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is one of description
techniques that has proven to be useful for constructing safety cases. Details
about GSN can be found in [11]. A number of extensions have been made to
GSN to define a safety case pattern language. Those extensions are given in [12].
Model-based development is the notion that we can build systems by con-
structing abstract representations of the system’s behavior and translating them
into something that executes on a target platform. A typical model-based ap-
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proach includes the following steps: 1) modeling the system, 2) analyzing and
verifying this model against the system requirements, 3) systematic transforma-
tion of the model into an implementation, and 4) validating the implementation
against the system requirements. We applied such model-based approach in de-
veloping the PCA implementation software. Therefore, one of the safety case
patterns we suggest (described in the Section 3) is an argument about the cor-
rectness of the implementation developed using the model-based approach.
3 The Proposed Safety Case Pattern
S1.1
Argument over the 
{from} and the 
development 
mechanism
J
J1.1.1
Justify this strategy by 
defining the mechanism that 
was used to develop {to} 
from {from}
C1.1.1
Define the 
{from}
G2
The {from} satisfies {part 
of the specific property}
G3
The used development 
mechanism guarantees the 
consistency between the {from} 
part and the {to} part
G4
The {to} is validated 
against the {specific 
property}
S1.2
Argument by 
validation
G1
The {to} satisfies {specific 
property} in {intended 
environment}
C1.1
Define the {to}
C1.3
Define the 
{specific 
property} C1.2
Define the 
{intended 
environment}
C2.1
Define the {part of 
the specific 
property}
Fig. 1. The proposed from to pattern
We are constructing a safety case for the PCA implementation software we
are developing. Due to the page limit, description for the entire PCA safety case
is not given. Instead, we concentrate on the safety case pattern extracted from
the PCA safety case. The proposed safety case pattern allows one to incorporate
the confidence in the model correctness obtained by using formal methods and
the confidence in the development process gained by using a well-established
development approach. This pattern is appropriate to be used when the system
is developed from the formal model using the model-based approach.
Figure 1 shows the GSN structure of the proposed from to pattern. Here, {to}
refers to the system implementation and {from} refers to a model of this system.
The claim (G1) about the implementation correctness (i.e., satisfaction of some
property (referenced in C1.3)) is justified not only by validation (G4 through
S1.2) but also by arguing over the model correctness (G2 through S1.1), and
the consistency between the model and the implementation created based on it
(G3 through S1.1). The model correctness (i.e., further development for G2) is
guaranteed through the model verification (i.e., the second step of the model-
based approach). The consistency between the model and the implementation
(i.e., further development for G3) is supported by the code generation from the
verified model (i.e., the third step of the model-based approach). Only part of the
property of concern (referenced in C2.1) can be verified at the model level due
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to the different abstraction levels between the model and the implementation.
However, the validation argument (S1.2) covers the entire property of concern
(referenced in C1.3). The additional justification given in (S1.1) increases the
assurance in the top-level claim (G1).
S1.1
Argument over the GPCA 
timed automata model and 
the development 
mechanism
J
J1.1.1
The model-based approach is 
used to develop the PCA 
implementation software based 
on the GPCA timed automata 
model.
C1.1.1
Link to the GPCA 
timed automata 
model
G2
The GPCA timed automata model 
satisfies the GPCA safety 
requirements that can be formalized 
and verified on the model level
C2.1
Link to the GPCA safety 
requirements that can be 
formalized and verified 
on the model level
G3
The used development mechanism 
propagates the GPCA safety 
requirements satisfaction from the 
GPCA timed automata model to the 
PCA implementation software
G4
The PCA implementation 
software is validated 
against the GPCA safety 
requirements
S1.2
Argument by validating the 
PCA implementation 
software againt the GPCA 
safety requirements
G1
The PCA implementation 
software satisfies the GPCA 
safety requirements
C1.1
The PCA implementation 
software means the software 
code generated from the GPCA 
reference model, and extended 
to interface with the target 
platform
C1.2
Define the intended environment 
based on the environment 
related safety requirements 
(sections 2, 6 and 4) and the 
environment interface as defined 
by the GPCA reference model.
C1.3
Link to the GPCA 
safety requirements 
document
Fig. 2. An instance of the from to pattern
Figure 2 shows an instantiation of this pattern that is part of the PCA safety
case. Based on [14], for this pattern instance, the {to} part is the PCA imple-
mentation software (referenced in C1.1), the {from} part is the GPCA timed
automata model (referenced in C1.1.1) and the GPCA safety requirements (ref-
erenced in C1.3) represent the concerned property. In this case, correct PCA
implementation means it satisfies the GPCA safety requirements that defined to
guarantee the PCA safety. The satisfaction of the GPCA safety requirements in
the implementation level (G1) is decomposed by two strategies (S1.1) and (S1.2).
The argument in (S1.1) is supported by the correctness of the GPCA timed au-
tomata model (G2), and the consistency between the model and the implemen-
tation (G3). The correctness of the GPCA timed automata model (i.e., further
development for G2) has been proved using the UPPAAL model-checker [4]
against the GPCA safety requirements that can be formalized (referenced in
C2.1). The consistency between the model and the implementation (i.e., further
development for G3) is supported by the code-synthesis from the verified GPCA
timed automata model. Not all the GPCA safety requirements (referenced in
C1.3) can be verified against the GPCA timed automata model [14]. Only the
part referenced in C2.1 can be formalized and verified in the model level (e.g.,
“no bolus dose shall be possible during the Power-On Self-Test”). Other require-
ments are not formalizable and/or cannot be verification against the model given
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its level of details (e.g., “the flow rate for the bolus dose shall be programmable”
cannot be formalized meaningfully and then verified in the model level).
Generally, using safety case patterns does not necessarily guarantee that the
constructed safety case will be sufficiently compelling. So when instantiating the
from to pattern, it is necessary to be able to provide justification for each taken
instantiation decision to guarantee that the constructed safety case is sufficiently
compelling. Guidance for justifying such decisions can be found in [8].
4 Related Work
Assurance cases for medical devices have been discussed in [19]. The work in [19]
can be used as staring point for the PCA safety case construction. A safety case
given in [10] was constructed for a pacemaker was also developed using the
model-based approach. This paper takes a step forward by proposing a safety
case pattern for the model-based approach. The concept of safety case patterns
was defined in [12]. Many safety case patterns were introduced in [3, 11, 18], but
none of them is defined to the model-based approach. Another set of patterns
are given in [17]. However, those patterns are introduced only by instantiation
examples, limiting their reuse.
The software contribution pattern introduced in [7] is related to the from to
pattern. Both concern software development and can be applied iteratively. How-
ever, the software contribution pattern is intended to show that the contribu-
tion made by the software to the system hazards are acceptably managed. The
from to pattern is intended to show the software satisfaction for some concerned
property, which can be used to address different aspects. The software contribu-
tion pattern is defined to be flexible enough and may be instantiated no matter
what development process is used. While the from to pattern is applicable only if
the development process guarantees consistency between the developed artifacts.
Focusing on a specific development approach (i.e., model-based development)
breaks the advantage of the flexibility. The propagation of the correctness be-
tween tiers is not part of the software contribution pattern itself [8]. In contrast,
the from to pattern argues over the correctness propagation from the {from} ar-
tifact to the {to} artifact. This argument strengthens the assurance in the {to}
correctness (i.e., the pattern top-level claim).
5 Conclusions
Our ongoing work is constructing a safety case for the PCA infusion pump sys-
tem that we are developing. In the development of the PCA implementation,
we applied the model-based approach starting from the GPCA model. Here, we
suggest a safety case pattern that can be instantiated to argue about the cor-
rectness of implementations developed using the model-based approach. Where
the correctness (i.e., satisfaction of required properties) of the implementation
is justified not only by validation but also by arguing over the model correctness
and the preservation of this correctness through the development process.
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In addition to constructing a safety argument for the PCA infusion pump,
we are also working on constructing confidence arguments that are necessary to
increase the confidence in the developed safety argument as suggested in [9].
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